The Danger of Authority Without Responsibility

Bureaucracies are strange things. Once created, they tend to perpetuate themselves and often grow into large, unwieldy corporate entities that take on a life of their own. I happen to work for one of the world’s largest and most notorious bureaucracies, the Federal Government of the United States. Specifically, I work for the Department of Defense, perhaps the largest bureaucracy within the US government. In my more cynical moments, when people ask me what I do for a living, I’ll tell them that I am a bureaucrat.

In almost thirty years of working directly for the DoD, either in uniform or as a civilian, I have come to the conclusion that the US military bureaucracy is too large, too top-heavy, and has developed a pathological culture of risk aversion, obstructionism, and excessive consensus-building. This has created a situation, devastating to organizations in general, in which most low- and mid-level bureaucrats are given responsibility with little or no authority, and most high-level bureaucrats (generals, admirals and senior civilians) have a great deal of authority and little, if any real responsibility. Such a situation directly violates one of the most basic tenets of leadership, which is that one should be given authority commensurate with one’s responsibility.

How did we get to this point? Put simply, there are too many people at the top with not enough real responsibility; so they have to create it. According to author Richard A. Gabriel, “Since Vietnam, the percentage of officers has fallen to 11 percent of total force strength. Curiously, however, as the number of officers relative to enlisted strength has declined since the war in Vietnam, the ratio of general officers to troop strength has increased by 31 percent. The Army has more general officers relative to the number of troops it can put in the field than it did during Vietnam. And the same is true of the Navy and the Air Force as well”. Since not every general or admiral is in the field commanding troops, what are they doing? They are in charge of large staff sections in the Pentagon or one of the several regional or functional commands around the world. Often, they are deputies or special assistants to higher ranking flag officers or senior civilians at the assistant or under-secretary level.

Here then, is the situation: you have a surfeit of ambitious, high ranking officers filling positions, many of which are of questionable value-added to the mission of the US military. Because they are flag officers, they possess a great deal of power and influence. Because they are ambitious, they frequently create an entire small fiefdom around themselves, dedicated to the advancement of a particular political, programmatic or policy agenda which will lead to their own promotion to the next higher rank. Thus, because this tendency is pervasive across the military establishment, a huge amount of work is generated by these individuals. Their staffs churn out hundreds of Power Point briefings, position papers, information papers, studies and analyses, most of which will become “shelf ware”. The low- to mid-level bureaucrats who prepare all of this material work extremely hard and are very diligent. Yet they often have little, if any, sense of the significance of their labor. They are rarely given any authority to speak for, or make decisions on behalf of, their organizations.

All this creates a culture of risk aversion. No one wants to fail or be seen to be incompetent. So incompetence and failure among senior officers is masked and diluted by the sheer number of senior officers and the creation of elaborate “governance” structures consisting of boards, steering groups and other “consensus building” bodies of which they are members. Thus, no one individual can be blamed for making a poor decision. Of course, these boards and steering groups require secretariat staffs to prepare all the briefing materials and coordinate the agenda – more activity leading to more shelf ware.

This practice of consensus building as a means to insure oneself against criticism has generated a strange practice called Joint Staff Action Plan (JSAP) staffing. Let’s say my office within the Joint Staff is the proponent for security assistance training, and my general wants to write a new security assistance policy for the military. A draft of this document must be circulated to every office in the Pentagon, every major joint command and every DoD Agency for comment. This is usually done three times: at the “action officer” (bureaucrat) level, the Colonel (Navy Captain) level, and the Flag Officer/General Officer level. Any comments considered “critical” must be successfully adjudicated with the commenting organization. Such a process stifles creativity and innovation, discourages risk taking, and tends to result in outcomes that give the appearance of progress, but in reality simply “kick the can down the road” and perpetuate the status quo.

Congress is the only organization in the Federal government authorized to establish the size and makeup of the US military. Legislation should be introduced and passed that will fix a target ratio of senior officers and civilians in the DoD at a level far lower than today. This target can be achieved through the gradual attrition of senior officers through the normal retirement process. Congress should also hold hearings to determine the necessity of the continued existence of non-warfighting commands and staffs, both at the Service and Joint levels.

The history of successful militaries, from the Roman legions to the German general staff in WWII, to the Israeli army, has shown that the most effective and efficient fighting forces can be fielded with a relatively few, key experienced and talented senior leaders. And we should never forget that the mission of the US military is to win our nation’s wars, not to provide a career path for high level bureaucrats.